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ABSTRACT 
Industrial democracy is an aspect of industrial relations system that entails a high degree of cooperation between 
union and management. This labor relations system is reinforced by the offer of a life-long employment which 
allows workers to feel secured and unthreatened by changes in technology or job characteristics. Within this 
context, therefore, industrial democracy which results from a process of collective bargaining assumes a 
mechanism for representing the interests of workers against management. This work is a descriptive survey that 
sought to determine the impact of labor unions on Industrial Democracy in the Rivers State civil service system. 
Three hypotheses were formulated in line with the objectives of this study. Data were generated through a 
structured questionnaire, interviews and observational techniques and analyzed using results from mean scores. 
Analysis showed that collective bargaining is not always employed in decisions concerning working conditions 
in the Rivers State civil services system. The second hypothesis justified that management unilaterally decides 
on issues concerning working conditions in Rivers State civil service system. Analysis of the third hypothesis 
showed that weakened and fragmented trade unionism inhibits the use of collective bargaining in decisions 
concerning working conditions in Rivers State civil service system. The study recommends that since working 
conditions of workers are required by law to be negotiated between employers and employees, enabling 
mechanism should be put in place for the existing laws to be enforceable, and punishment used/applied where 
there is breach of law relating to conflict resolution activities. 
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INDRODUCTION   
In an effective industrial relations system, a strong, stable, well focused and democratically run trade 
unionism, strengthens industrial democracy through their involvement in and their expansion of the scope of 
collective bargaining processes (ILO 2014, NLC 2008 and IDE 1993). Conversely, the pessimistic perspective 
considers trade unionism as machines through which capitalists’ employers and the state employ to apply brakes 
on the revolutionary fervor of the working class or what Trasky (2000) describes as “lieutenants of capital” in 
the intensified  exploitation of workers (Hinto and Hyman 1975  cited in Aye, 2010).  
 
Basically, industrial democracy has varieties of meanings that can be read into it. It reaches from workers’ self-
management via consultation and co-determination to collective bargaining, and in passing picks up such diverse 
notions as job enrichment and autonomous work groups (white and Dennison, 1990, Jentseh 2007 and Poolo, 
Lansbury and Wailes, 1999). Amongst others, industrial democracy could be seen as the structure and 
institutional mechanisms that give workers or their representatives the opportunity to influence organizational 
decision-making in their places of work (Hommer 1998). However, whatever spectrum one assesses industrial 
democracy its bottom line is that, it is a mechanism for protecting the rights and safeguarding the interests of 
industrial workers (Clegg, 2006). Essentially, this mechanism creates a sense of belonging of workers to their 
organizations, improves a sense of commitment to organizational objectives, plans and activities among 
employees, satisfies psychological needs of the employees, and respects the human dignity of employees (Frege, 
2005; Gill and Krieger, 1999, and Sturmthal, 2008). These feats can only be achieved through trade unionism. 
 
Historically, trade unionism (as a system, method or practice of trade or labor unions) is influenced amongst 
other things by: the dominant conception of trade unionism with it, the history of its emergence, and the 
economic and politico-legal framework which the industrial relations system is situated in (Poole, Lansbury and 
Waile 1999). The major means through which trade unions pursue their substantive and procedural goals of trade 
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unionism is collective bargaining (Sen, 2010). Therefore, collective bargaining is one of many ways of managing 
conflicts and enhancing cooperation in an industrial organization. It goes to show that trade unionism’s 
collective bargaining is an instrument through which the institution of democracy in an organization is 
established, and by extension, the process through which participative management is implemented (White and 
Dennison 1999). It is in the light of this that Webs in their seminal study industrial democracy 1902 cited in 
White and Dennison, (1999) asserts that trade unions were the prime agents of industrial democracy. And the 
method of collective bargaining is the prime instrument for advancing industrial democracy as collective 
bargaining between employers and unions provides a more equal balance in determining the individual wage-
work bargain and how work is organized in organizations. Various countries of the world have adopted some 
varied means of industrial democracy in their practice of industrial relations system. For instance, as practiced in 
Germany, industrial democracy means that workers are represented at the plant level in work councils and at 
corperate level through co-determination (Mejia, Balkin and Cardy 2003). While work councils are committees 
composed of both worker representatives and managers who have responsibility for governing the workplace; 
codetermination on the other hand, involves worker representation on a corporation’s board of directors. As 
forms of industrial democracy in Germany, these practices have become amplified and deeply rooted in the way 
employers, unions and employees relate in the workplace (Davies, 1994). 
 
In Japan, industrial democracy entails a system of industrial relations process characterized by a high degree of 
cooperation between unions and management. A key factor in this process is the Japanese enterprise union. 
Enterprise union in Japan, as a form of industrial democracy, involves labor union representatives of workers in 
only one large company rather than in a particular industry (Davies, 1994). The underlying reasons for enterprise 
unionism is embedded in the Japanese lifetime and long-term employment practices whereby employees remain 
with a particular company throughout their entire career (Takashi, 1994). Industrial relations practices in USA 
and UK place heavy reliance on the process of collective bargaining as a mechanism for representing the 
interests of workers against employers, without requiring representation of workers interests within the corporate 
structure through worker representation on management boards (Anya 2005). The form of industrial democracy 
in this view is limited to bargainable issues basically on terms and conditions of employment.  
 
Coming closer home, the distinct trait that marks the industrial relations system and trade union practice in 
Nigeria is the heritage of our colonial past. Industrial democracy in Nigeria, therefore takes the form of 
collective bargaining. It is in recognition of the importance of industrial democracy that the Morgan commission 
(1963 - 1964) on Review of conditions of service of junior cadre of employees of government of Nigeria States 
thus: 
 
     ...It is nonetheless the policy in Nigeria that salaries and wages indeed, 
     the whole fabrics of industrial relations, should be fashioned, attained, 
     and sustained by means of collective bargaining… (Anya 2005) 
 
The government policy of encouraging and sustaining democracy in the Nigerian industrial sector has permeated 
till date. Prospects for industrial democracy in Nigeria are not a mechanical affair, but largely depend on a 
number of factors. However, trade union practice and government attitude to employees undermine the 
effectiveness of this mechanism, hence, the challenges of industrial democracy within the Nigeria  
context. This study is, therefore, aimed at examining the practice of trade unions in Rivers State with the view to 
ascertaining their relationship to the challenges of industrial democracy in the state’s civil service system. To 
achieve the above, the following hypotheses were stated and tested: 
 
I. Collective bargaining is always employed in decisions concerning working conditions of workers in the 
Rivers State civil service system. 
II. Management does unilaterally decide on issues concerning working conditions in the Rivers State civil 
service system. 
III. Weakened and fragmented trade unionism does inhibit the use of collective bargaining on decisions 
concerning working conditions in the Rivers State civil service system 
 
Literature Review  
Collective bargaining has been known to be an effective tool by trade unions in ensuring industrial democracy. 
However, as observed by scholars, there are factors that hinder the use of collective bargaining in decisions 
concerning working conditions in most organizations. As observed by Hammond (2007) collective bargaining is 
seen as an exercise of power, the outcome of which is determined by the abilities of each side of the bargain to 
make effective use of their power. While the employer’s concern is the ability of the union to back up its 
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demands through the amount of power the union brings to the bargaining table, the unions on the other hand 
ensure that they improve the deal that their members get in return for work. But, unfortunately, their bargaining 
power is often used by the employers to fool and bluff the unions in the negotiation process. Umanah (1982) 
argues that within this context, the employers are at negotiation corner grant to themselves the ability to set the 
best earnings and fool the employees into believing that they are giving the best offer. They further argue that 
within the context of the fooling as an instrument of gaining bargaining power, the employers either embark on 
their deceiving or tactical deceiving power on facts before them. 
 
However, with deceiving about the facts during collective bargaining sessions according to the Umanah (1982) 
the employers falsify not only information on production capacities, stocks, costs, financial allocation from 
federation account, and revenue generated, but may fool as to the relative strength and weakness of the enterprise 
in the socio-economic community. Doom may be expressed even within the climate of viability. The resultant 
effect of the deceit when discovered by the employees will be that there will be mutual distrust to their 
representatives thereby stalling the effective use of collective bargaining with tactical deceiving. Umanah (1982) 
further points out that the employers will know everything about the employees strengths and weaknesses only 
to stall the employees in the negotiation process in other to achieve maximal outcome on the issues or matters 
under negotiations. 
 
Echoing in the same vein, Hammond (2007) asserts that often time employers are extremely so powerful that the 
workers have no influence over them such that it rather becomes not difficult for such employers to determine 
unilaterally the terms and conditions of employment giving no room for collective bargaining. Similarly, Ewepu 
(2010) argues that collective bargaining has become an instrument of political manipulation. According to him, 
bargaining power has always been used to fool the employees from the point of appointing and consulting 
government representation to the bargaining process itself. A case in point is that under Prof. Borishade, a 
former minister of education, where government and Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) reached an 
agreement through collective bargaining with government, the government disowned such agreement after few 
months without regard to the effects their actions may have on those being represented in the process. 
 
Bargaining skill is another factor that hinders the effective use of collective bargaining in decisions concerning 
working conditions of workers. As opined by Umanah (1982) the employers employ facts, emotions and 
communication skills within the context of negotiations to maximally achieve the expected goals of negotiation 
to the disadvantages of the employees. Generally, negotiation is concerned with purposeful persuasions and 
constructive compromise to obtain substantive results, dividing the cost and benefit and achieving the goals 
dictated by the interest of both the organization and members of the trade union, and influencing the balance of 
power of all parties. This, however, is not often the case in most negotiation processes. Employers in a bid to 
achieve a win-lose solution adopt certain skills to their favor and to the detrainment of the employees. For 
instance, as argued by Robbins (1998) Buchanan (1991), Venkata, (2006), employers make use of skilled 
negotiators, who are better listeners and assessors with defensive tactics to outdo the trade unions. In other 
words, some employers are better at creating a climate necessary for reaching a distributive settlement. Unions 
on the other hand may have the requisite awareness and skills in driving home their demands thereby not 
achieving good faith in a collective bargaining situation (Tang and Bridge 1986). 
 
In likewise, a bargaining strength is used as a threat of mutual destruction in the bargaining process (Umanah 
1982). Corroborating this fact, Miren, (1998) asserts that employers adopt bargaining strength to deter the 
employees and their unions who may be so unintelligent as to comprehend such a threat or who may be too weak 
to enforce or assert their demands to the employers. For instance, as opined by Reed (1989), workers 
organizations may not be able to fulfill their purpose of “furthering and defending” the interests of workers 
through a collective bargaining process. They are at times independent, not able to organize their activities and 
are always subject to interferences by the public authorities. Adding credence to this, Otobo (1988), argues that 
most employees’ organizations are under the control of trade employers or employers organizations and are 
always subjugated by the bargaining strength of the employers who employed them. 
 
Buttressing this point, Nwadiora (2009), adds that the bargaining strength of employers impact negatively on 
trade unions. According to him, it weakens trade unions, disorients and disempowers the workers, thus making 
workers fear official victimization/intimidation by government and employers. Arguing further, Nwadiora, 
asserts that there are instances where government makes concerted efforts to weaken the unions either by 
harassing their leadership or divide their ranks along ethnic lines. These actions lead to fragmentation between 
labor unions and this serves to limit the effectiveness of the unions. He concludes that lack of awareness of 
negotiation’s objectives by workers or their organizations because of ineffective communication between 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.7, No.10, 2017 
 
85 
bargainers and members further strengthens the bargaining strength of the employers. This, according to him, 
enhances the divide and rule strategies of employers which hinder the effective use of collective bargaining in 
decisions concerning working conditions of workers in most Nigerian organizations in general and the Rivers 
State civil service system in particular. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Given the above literature review, an attempt is made to examine the nature of trade unionism on industrial 
democracy in the Rivers State civil service system. To achieve this, ten ministries were randomly sampled out of 
twenty-three in the Rivers State civil service namely: ministries of justice, information, education, women 
affairs, agriculture, health, transport, finance, housing, and culture and Tourism. A survey method, questionnaire 
and personal interview techniques were used as the main instruments for collecting the primary data. 
Questionnaire was built out of the hypotheses and based on likert scale principle of strongly agreed (SA), Agreed 
(A), Undecided (U), Disagreed (D), strongly disagreed (SD). 
 
On the whole, 300 copies of a structured questionnaire were distributed across the ten ministries at 30 copies per 
ministry. 213 copies were properly filled and returned. Z-test of mean was used to analyze all the hypotheses 
stated with the following outcomes: 
 
Hypothesis I 
Collective bargaining is always employed in decisions concerning working conditions of workers in the Rivers 
State civil service system. 
 
Table 1: Collective bargaining and working conditions of workers 
 SA A UD D SD Total 
Questionnaire item 5 4 3 2 1 Responses 
Item 4 20 13 10 150 20 213 
Item 5 10 12 - 160 21 213 
Item 6 5 10 10 150 38 213 
Frequency 35 35 20 460 79 639 
∑-ranks x frequency 175 140 60 960 79 1374 
Source: Field work, 2016 
 
∑Ranks x Frequency 
Total Responses (n) 
 
= 1374 = 2.16 
    639 
= 2 
 
Decision Rule – Accept the hypothesis if the computed value is greater than the critical (Table) value, otherwise 
reject it. 
 
Based on the above analyses, we therefore reject the hypothesis which states that collective bargaining is always 
employed in decisions concerning working conditions of workers in Rivers State civil service system. This 
therefore implies that collective bargaining is not always employed in decisions concerning working conditions 
of workers in the Rivers State civil service system. This supports the view of Umanah (1982) who suggested 
that: 
 
…unfortunately, bargaining power is often used by the employers to  
Fool and bluff the unions in the negotiation process… agreements  
reached may be denied the employees.., which is a complete non- 
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Hypothesis II  
Management does unilaterally decide on issues concerning working conditions in the Rivers State civil service 
system. 
 
Table 1.2: Management and unilateral decision on working conditions  
Questionnaire SA A UD D SD Total 
Item 5 4 3 2 1 Responses 
Item 7 80 70 10 20 23 213 
Item 8 80 80 10 30 13 213 
Frequency 160 150 20 60 36 426 
∑-ranks x frequency 800 600 60 120 36 1616 
Source: Field work, 2016 
 
∑Ranks x Frequency 
Total Responses (n) 
 
= 1616   = 3.37 
    426  
    
= 4 
 
Decision rule – accept the hypothesis, if the computed value is greater than the table value, otherwise reject it. 
 
Based on the analyses above we accept the hypothesis which states that management does unilaterally decide on 
issues concerning working conditions of workers in the Rivers State civil service system. This confirms the work 
of Emepu (2010) who asserts that: 
 
Collective bargaining has become an instrument of political manipulation in the hands of management…used to 
fool the employees from the point of appointing and consulting government representatives (management). This 




 Weakened and fragmented trade unionism does inhibit the use of collective bargaining in decisions concerning 
working conditions in the Rivers State civil service system. 
 
Table 1.3:  Weakened and fragmented trade unionism and collective bargaining 
Questionnaire SA A UD D SD Total 
Item 9 5 4 3 2 1 Responses 
Item 10 70 70 20 30 23 213 
Item 80 80 - 40 13 213 
Frequency 150 150 20 70 36 426 
∑-ranks x frequency 750 600 60 140 36 1586 
Source: Field work, 2016 
 
∑Ranks x Frequency  
Total Responses (n) 
 
= 1616   = 3.37 
    426 
 
=   4 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.7, No.10, 2017 
 
87 
Decision Rule – accept the hypothesis, if the computed value is greater than the table value; otherwise reject it. 
 
Based on the above analyses, we accept the hypothesis which states that weakened and fragmented trade 
unionism does inhibit the use of collective bargaining in decisions concerning workers conditions of service in 
the River State civil service system. This conforms to the work of Nwadiora (2009) who asserts that: 
 
        …The bargaining strength of employers impact negatively on trade  
          Unions due to weakened and fragmented trade unionism… 
 
Conclusion 
The analyses and interpretations show that trade unionism as practiced in the Rivers State civil service system 
has posed serious challenges to industrial democracy. These challenges experienced in the Rivers State civil 
service system shows that workers or their representatives do not exercise their power over decisions concerning 
their working conditions. In the situation were workers or their representatives do not have the power on issues 
concerning their working conditions, management takes unilateral decisions on issues of workers’ working 
conditions. This practice does not allow for a good system of industrial relations. The challenges on industrial 
democracy is further experienced where the power of trade of unionism is weakened and its structure fragmented 
by management. This then inhibits the use of collective bargaining in decisions that concern the working 
conditions of workers in the Rivers State civil service system. These situations ought to be reversed for an 
improved industrial democracy to prevail in Rivers State. 
 
Recommendations 
Based on the findings on this study, the following recommendations are made: 
 
1.  Since working conditions of workers are required by law to be negotiated between employers and 
employees, an enabling mechanism should be put in place for the existing laws to be enforceable, and 
punishment where there is breach of the law be imposed on their eering party. 
2.  Strategies should be put in place to enhance the principles of checks and balances between trade unions 
and management during a collective bargaining process. 
3. Trade union members and leaders alike should demonstrate internal democracy within their unions. 
This will in turn enhance industrial democracy in their various organizations. This should be 
applicable to the case of Rivers State civil service system. 
4. Since a trade union is a vehicle for the articulation of the collective interests of workers, union members 
should be made to participate in all their activities. This will avoid undue suppression of unions by 
management and also remove the general conception by workers that unions are patriarchal and 
oligachical organizations when viewed on the basis of effective bargaining processes.  
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